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In a word then, so far as Giddings has applied his strength within the recognized lines of scientific method he has earned the gratitude of sociologists. In so far as he has attempted to operate a method of his own his processes are of a sort which the maturer sciences long since disowned, and most sociologists have had enough scientific discipline to insure them against voluntary exchange of positive science for dogmatism.

The task of analyzing forms of human association, past and present, of determining the forces operating through these forms, and of generalizing the laws of their action, is a task in which real progress can be made only by strict observance of those conditions of knowledge which have passed into settled scientific tradition. The unscientific remainder in our minds is never perfectly secure against seduction by the fair promises of lawless speculation. It is to be regretted that Professor Giddings has made the meretricious element so conspicuous in his book that it will have more influence upon the great majority of readers than the strictly scientific portions.

ALBION W. SMALL.

An Introduction to Sociology. By ARTHUR FAIRBANKS. The English and Foreign Philosophical Library. Pp. xv + 274. \$2.00. Imported by Charles Scribner's Sons.

THE author's programme is thus stated in the preface: "It has been my aim to furnish a brief introduction to the subject, which would make plain to the reader something of its scope and importance, and, it may be, aid him in further study. That the specialist in sociological investigation will find much here to advance the knowledge of the science is not my expectation." Taking this explanation at face value I should say that the book does unusually well what it proposes. No one who can intelligently read current technical discussions in sociology will find in the volume either new information or contributions to method. College teachers are dealing continually, however, with students who are just beginning to suspect that there is something real beneath that obscure term, sociology. I have seen no better book to put into the hands of students at just that stage. Herbert Spencer's *Study of Sociology* might be prescribed to create the appetite which this book may for a time feed. Mackenzie's *Introduction to Social Philosophy* contains in principle everything that is valuable in this book,

but not in so elementary and easy form. Compared with Giddings' book this one is less pretentious, less speculative, and less fanciful. I should say that its author has worked his way through some of the plainer preliminary commonplaces of sociology, and his conclusions so far are set down in a way that will prove helpful to others who have not yet had that experience. The book seems to me on the whole a sane expression of opinion about more obvious phases of social phenomena, by a man who has had good introductions to most forms of contemporary thought. Whether he has had immediate scientific contact with reality at any point I am unable to judge.

The most serious charge which I should bring against the book as a tool for beginners is that it stops with giving them the author's views. It does next to nothing in the way of pointing out how they are to exercise their own powers in deriving knowledge of society. From allusions here and there I infer that the author had theological students chiefly in mind. The method of the book does nothing to correct the inevitable tendency among men of their usual intellectual antecedents to be satisfied with approach to reality mainly through books. I am very sure that the wisest teachers will one day agree that much study of social activities in the concrete should precede study of sociology. This book does not seem to have broken with the superstition that we may arrive at scientific knowledge of society by working over unscientific opinions about society. The author has not himself gone far astray in this direction, because he has evidently tried to systematize conclusions which are reasonably clear, and has withstood the temptation to get credit for originality by unwarranted theorizing. Nevertheless his manner of treatment and the bibliography appended lead me to the belief that his own method of work is practically the averaging of essays.

Whatever be our hypotheses about society or sociology, all investigators ought to be agreed that an essential condition of the advance of social science is accumulation of precise data all along the line. Of catchweight evidence we have had enough. Yet men who do not count on raising grapes from thorns nor figs from thistles still imagine that dialectic agitation, if kept up long enough, will churn ignorance of society into social science. I say this the more freely in this connection because the occasion is rather in the omissions than in the commissions of the book. I find, however, that in the treatment of social development the author has done little to show how

vague and hypothetical is most of the biological interpretation which he assumes in stating the apparent course of social evolution. Every man who presumes to deal with sociology ought to resolve that whatever else he does, he will convince his students that further knowledge of society is not to be gained by rearranging the inexact notions stored up in the symbols of current language, but by patient examination of social details and reconstruction of unauthorized concepts.

The book is full of indications that the author is not yet sufficiently at home among the sociologists to give the essentials and the non-essentials of their procedure proportionate attention. He betrays more nervousness than necessary about trivialities, and even personalities, which he imagines to be of some general significance. This might be illustrated throughout his discussion of the organic concept of society. He has evidently failed to distinguish between individual versions of social relations and the essential conception, about which there is really no disagreement. He apparently prefers on the whole to class himself with those who do not call society an organism (339), yet I doubt if even Spencer meant more by the organic analogy than is implied throughout this book. Everybody who finds it worth while to study society at all does so because he believes that there are coherences, both contemporary and consecutive, between social activities. If this were not so a science of society would be as impossible as a science of a sand-heap. Froude in his youth asserted the sand-heap analogy, but he could not hold to it and study history. If we agree with the later and wiser Froude, we are at one on the fundamental relation. Our differences are upon the extent to which social coherences are made out, and the best names to give them. Even if we were to admit that Lillienfeld and Spencer and Schäffle worked out the organic analogy in tedious and extravagant detail, it remains true that all this was necessary to hammer the perception of omnipresent social coherence into the brains of a few observers of society. The book before us could not have been written had not Schäffle's *Bau und Leben* given the impulse. I protest against the ingratitude of denying to these pioneers their due. No expert can read this book without tracing the direct and indirect influence of the Schäffle school. I do not mean that the book contains indications that its author has read Schäffle. He has at least caught up so much from the method which Schäffle has done most to form that I fail to understand how he can

be unconscious of his debt, or how he can honestly omit generous acknowledgment of it (*cf.* pp. 31-2).

The arrangement of the book seems to me rather accidental. It was apparently an afterthought to make a separate title—Part II, Social Development—for the last four chapters. There is no corresponding title, "Part I," and the frequent references to social development in the first ten chapters (*cf.* pp. 124 *sq.*, 141 *sq.*, 158 *sq.*, etc.) lead the reader to suspect that the purpose to treat that phase of the subject separately was not in the author's original plan. On the other hand, chapters xiii and xiv seem to be much more an analysis of contemporary phenomena than of the historical process of social development. They are not sufficiently unlike Part I to deserve a separate heading.

Perhaps the author's manner of dealing with the "social forces" illustrates as well as any portion of the book the rudimentary character of its conceptions and methods. On page 62 we read: "Both social and unsocial tendencies are at work in each stage of social development: some forces (*sic*) tending to draw men closer together in society, and others tending to break up the societies so formed." In contrast with this very plain proposition, chapter v, "Causes of Social Activity," starts out with the following observations:

Those writers who have recognized this dynamic character of society have generally discussed the topics of the present chapter under the title "Social Forces," and in choosing a different term I may properly point out the misconception which I believe is involved in the use of the former one. Social force properly denotes the energy of a social group. This force is essentially the same, and is to be determined in the same way, for each of the different kinds of social groups. . . . Social forces do not exist, but only social force, and the study of this force belongs to the study of the general composition of a social group.

This sort of thinking is possible only among persons who are still in the bonds of dialecticism. If we wish to substitute a dogmatic monism for analysis of phenomena, why stop with the unity of *social* forces? Why not avoid all need of discrimination by resting in the unity of *all* force? The author seems to see nothing but a quantitative meaning in the use of the term "social forces" which he rejects. His declaration that *social forces* do not exist, but only *social force*, is true and false precisely as the like is true and false of physical forces or force. As it stands in this chapter it is entirely gratuitous and

irrelevant from the point of view of the investigator, though it is rendered harmless by well-ordered discussion of obvious manifestations of the social forces under the name "Causes of Social Activity."

In classifying the "Modes of Social Activity" (chap. vi), the author has fallen into the very error which he deplores in others, *i. e.*, division according to more than one principle (108). He would have done better had he adopted De Greef's classification of social activities ("Phenomena"). The latter is at least more self-consistent. Division of activities into (1) economic, (2) social, (3) political, (4) psychical applies neither an objective nor a subjective principle consistently, as the author half realizes (121). Were the operations of the silver miners' agents in the Chicago Convention an "economic mode of activity" or a "political mode of activity?" Is the campaign now in progress "political activity" or "psychical activity?" Questions of this sort might be multiplied indefinitely to expose the mixed method of classification. If we drop the terms employed and rearrange the groups of phenomena with which the fourfold classification deals, application of the author's own principle, *viz.*, the classification of social activities according to the stimuli from which they spring, we shall find in his own specifications groupings of social activities according to the objective stimuli which produced them. These groups so rearranged very closely approach the classification which I believe to be logical and adequate. The author combines in his schedule what I have called the health stimulus with that which I call the wealth stimulus under the head the "economic stimulus." Otherwise his list of stimuli would be identical with that which I have proposed in the series—health, wealth, sociability, knowledge, beauty, righteousness. His account of the distinction between "moral" and "religious" activity is inglorious repetition of conventionality. There is no sign of independent examination of the phenomena.

Two passages interested me particularly as unintended commentaries on Professor Giddings' amiable fiction "consciousness of kind." The first is in development of a proposition already quoted (62): "Both social and unsocial tendencies are at work in each stage of social development." The second is in the chapter on "Causes of Social Activity." The first cause specified is "need of food" (94). The second (98) is "need of protection against fellowmen." Under this head the author observes:

The second original social stimulus is the need of protection against one's

fellow-beings. . . . The worst foe of man is man himself. Under peculiar circumstances some savage races have lived in such small and fluid groups that on the whole they have succeeded in avoiding each other. . . . Many savage tribes only unite in the presence of a common danger, and fear is always a potent force in developing functional bonds of union.

I shall hope to learn whether this author concludes that he is wrong and that Professor Giddings is right.

If space permitted, I might comment at length on some of the crudenesses which the book betrays. Examples would be the notion of biology implied on page 15; the harmony (?) of the logical and the chronological (pp. 14, 15); the resurrection of the bugaboo "biological organism" (p. 32 *et passim*); the solemn rejection of the term "social cohesion" (p. 64), and then the extended exploitation of the parallel term "natural selection" (221-264). A brief conference with any intelligent biologist would inform our author that "natural selection" is today a problem not a solution. Sociology is, therefore, simply pointed to unexplored facts by either of the contrasted phrases.

The chapter which seems to me most successful is that on "The Social Mind." It is more objective and therefore more valuable than the chapter under the same title in Professor Giddings' book.

In spite of the reservations expressed and implied above I welcome the book and heartily recommend it to beginners and teachers of beginners in sociology.

ALBION W. SMALL.

Bau und Leben des sozialen Körpers. VON DR. A. SCHÄFFLE.
Zweite Auflage. Erster Band; Allgemeine Sociologie, pp. xiv+571: M. 12. Zweiter Band; Spezielle Sociologie, pp. vii+656: M. 12. Tübingen, 1896. Verlag der H. Laupp'schen Buchhandlung.

THE first edition of this work is known by name to everybody in this country who has pretended to study sociology. It would surprise me to receive proof that twenty people in the United States have a first-hand acquaintance with the substance of the four volumes. Just enough is known about them to permit wholesale misunderstanding and misrepresentation. Since the present edition is compressed, in two volumes, to about half the bulk of its predecessor, and since the impression has been gaining ground that it may, after all, be worth